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Abstract

The exculpatory rhetorical power of the term "honest belief " continues to invite reliance on the bare
credibility of belief in consent to determine culpability in sexual assault. In law, however, only a
comprehensive analysis of mens rea, including an examination of the material facts and circumstances of
which the accused was aware, demonstrates whether a "belief ' in consent was or was not reckless or wilfully
blind. An accused's "honest belief " routinely begs this question, leading to a truncated analysis of criminal
responsibility and error. The problem illustrates how easily old rhetoric perpetuates assumptions that no
longer have a place in Canadian law.
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HONEST BELIEFS, CREDIBLE LIES,
AND CULPABLE AWARENESS:
RHETORIC, INEQUALITY, AND MENS
REA IN SEXUAL ASSAULT©
BY LUCINDA VANDERVORT*

The exculpatory rhetorical power of the term
"honest belief" continues to invite reliance on the bare
credibility of belief in consent to determine culpability in
sexual assault. In law, however, only a comprehensive
analysis of mens rea, including an examination of the
material facts and circumstances of which the accused
was aware, demonstrates whether a "belief' in consent
was or was not reckless or wilfully blind. An accused's
"honest belief" routinely begs this question, leading to a
truncated analysis of criminal responsibility and error.
The problem illustrates how easily old rhetoric
perpetuates assumptions that no longer have a place in
Canadian law.

La puissance rhdtorique disculpatoire du terme
croyance sincere " continue I solliciter confiance,
bas~e uniquement sur la cr~dibilit& de la croyance au
consentement afin de determiner la culpabilit6 lors d'une
agression sexuelle. LUgalement, cependant, seulement
une analyse complete du mens rea, comportant un
examen des faits matrriels et des circonstances desquels
I'accuse etait conscient, drmontre si une - croyance - au
consentement 6tait ou n'dtait pas insouciante ou
volontairement aveugle. La , croyance sincrre - d'un
accuse invoque couramment cette question, menant A
une analyse incomplete de la responsabilit6 criminelle,
et Aune erreur. Le probl~me illustre comment la vieille
rh6torique perprtue facilement des hypotheses qui n'ont
plus leur place dans le droit canadien.
'

I.

INTRODUCTION ................................................

626

II.

SEXUAL ASSAULT AND "HONEST BELIEF"
IN CONSENT IN RECENT CASES .................................

627

III.

R. v. MA CFIE ....................................................

629

IV.

PAPPAJOHNAND ITS LEGACY: A CAUTIONARY TALE ...........

632

V.

CULPABLE AWARENESS AND BELIEF: A RESTATEMENT ........

641

VI.

CULPABLE AWARENESS AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY ......

648

VII.

CULPABLE AWARENESS, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY,
AND SEXUAL ASSAULT .........................................

654

© 2004, L.A. Vandervort.
Associate Professor, College of Law, University of Saskatchewan. The author presented a draft
of this article as a "work in progress" to the Feminism and Law Workshop, Faculty of Law, University
of Toronto, February 14, 2003. Comments by participants and anonymous reviewers were valuable in
preparing the final draft.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 42, No. 4

VIII. OBJECTIVE OR SUBJECTIVE? ...................................

658

IX.

660

I.

CONCLUSION ..................................................

INTRODUCTION

The exculpatory rhetorical power of the term "honest belief'
continues to invite reliance on the bare credibility of belief in consent to
determine culpability, despite the 1992 amendments to the sexual assault
provisions in the CriminalCode.' The consequence is error in analysis of
criminal responsibility for the offence of sexual assault. The term "honest
belief," and the cursory approach to analysis of mens rea it encourages, are

ongoing sources of confusion and error for decision makers in the criminal
justice system and for the public. This affects the decisions made by
complainants and police and creates a risk of improper convictions and
acquittals, violating equality rights, and defeating the public interest in the
impartial administration of justice. Analysis of mens rea or culpable
awareness must therefore shift its focus away from the accused's supposedly
exculpatory belief to a detailed examination of the accused's awareness of
material facts. With such an analysis, fewer decisions will depend solely on

the bare credibility of the accused's purportedly exculpatory belief in2
consent. The effect will be to reduce the impact of bias and discrimination
on the handling of sexual assault cases at all stages of the Canadian criminal

justice system.
This article argues that section 273.2 of the CriminalCode codifies
the established common law doctrine governing mens rea in sexual assault,
retains the requirement of proof of subjective fault in sexual assault, and is
not in contravention of section 7 of the Charterof Rights and Freedoms.3

I R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 [Criminal Code].
2 Part I of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.
11 [Charter]. Section 273.2 is to be interpreted in a manner that renders it effective to protect the
constitutional rights of accused persons and persons vulnerable to sexual coercion and exploitation, as
proposed in the preamble to An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (sexual assault), S.C. 1992, c. 38 [Act
to Amend], the act legislating these provisions. In this paper, that objective was pursued through close
scrutiny of the actual practical effects of doctrine in context and a fundamental reexamination of the
significance of culpable awareness for criminal responsibility. These approaches may prove fruitful in
the analysis of other aspects of the criminal law within a framework of egalitarian principles.
3 Professor Don Stuart discusses grounds for constitutional challenge of section 273.2 (a)(ii) in his
Brief on Bill C-49, An Act to Amend the CriminalCode (sexual assault), tabled 12 December 1991, 4
February 1992, at 7-19, and in "Sexual Assault: Substantive Issues Before and After Bill C-49" (1993)
35 Crim. L.Q. 241-63. Legal and political issues raised by the prospect of judicial examination of the
1992 legislation within a Charterframework are discussed by Rosemary Cairns-Way, "Bill C-49 and the
Politics of Constitutionalized Fault" (1993) 42 U.N.B.L.J. 325-34.
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Section 273.2 is construed as a restatement of existing law, enacted to
clarify and reaffirm the scope of criminal responsibility in sexual assault,
and to secure more effective enforcement of laws prohibiting sexual

coercion.
II.

SEXUAL ASSAULT AND "HONEST BELIEF" IN CONSENT
IN RECENT CASES

In the years between the decision by the Supreme Court of Canada
in R v. Pappajohn4 in 1980 and the enactment of section 273.2 of the
CriminalCode5 in 1992, the "defence" of "honest belief" in consent came
to be seen as a major obstacle to the effective enforcement of sexual assault
law. By 1992, it was widely believed that a credible "honest belief' in
consent is invariably a full "defence" to sexual assault-even when the
belief is unreasonable-and that evidence sufficient to create reasonable
doubt about knowledge of non-consent, and thereby negative a mens rea of
criminal intent, "absolves" or "exonerates" the accused and requires
acquittal. These assumptions appeared in general public discussions 6 as well
as academic and professional materials 7 on sexual assault law written during
the 1980s, and created strong support among women in Canada for the

By contrast, this article interprets section 273.2(a)(ii) within the traditional framework of
subjective liability and supports the Supreme Court of Canada's reading of the section as a codification
of common law, consistent with the fundamental principles of criminal justice, and secure against the
challenges Cairns-Way anticipated under sections 7 and 11 of the Charter.
[1980] 2 S.C.R. 120 [Pappajohn].
5Act to Amend, supra note 2,
s. 1.
6 See e.g. The War Against Women, First Report of the Standing Committee on Health and
Welfare, Social Affairs, Seniors and the Status of Women, House of Commons, Canada, June 1991,
Recommendation 20 at 45, calling for "repeal of the defence of 'mistake of fact."' The Report (ibid.at
44) states:
Since 1980, it has been settled law in this country that an honest, unreasonable mistake as
to non-consent could absolve an accused charged with sexual assault, as held by the Supreme
Court of Canada in the Pappajohn case. Where an accused leads evidence that he was under
a mistaken belief that a sexual act was consensual, the law allows him to use this as the basis
for the defence that he did not commit the mental element of the offence.
7 Don Stuart, CanadianCriminalLaw, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1987) at 247-50; Allan
Manson,
Annotation of Sansregret v. K. (1985) 45 C.R. (3d) 193 at 194; Toni Pickard & Phil Goldman,
Dimensionsof CriminalLaw (Toronto: Emond-Montgomery, 1992) at B-191, B-267, B-483; See also
Toni Pickard, "Culpable Mistakes and Rape: Harsh Words on Pappajohn"(1980) 30 U.T.L.J. 415.
However, this defence often failed to persuade judges.
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enactment of section 273.28 in 1992.
Section 273.2 creates a statutory bar9 to reliance on a belief that the
complainant consented as a defence." After enactment of section 273.2 in
1992, however, some academic discussions of the significance of "honest
belief in consent" for mens rea in sexual assault continued to assert the
validity of many propositions that had dominated discussions in the 1980s."
This occurred despite the explicit assertion/affirmation by the Supreme
Court of Canada that at common law an "honest belief' is exculpatory only
if it is neither reckless nor wilfully blind. 12 Combined with related
statements by the Court in recent decisions about section 273.2 and the
relationships between "honest belief," "recklessness," and "wilful
blindness," this makes it clear that the Court views section 273.2 as a
codification of common law that is fully consistent with the law of mens rea
in sexual assault as articulated by Justice Dickson, as he then was, in
Pappajohn. These developments suggest that the interpretations of
Pappajohnthat caused widespread consternation in the 1980s, and continue
to be influential, were based on a flawed appreciation of the legal
significance of belief in consent for mens rea in sexual assault.
8 It is not a defence to a charge under section 271, 272, or 273 that the accused believed that the
complainant consented to the activity that forms the subject-matter of the charge, where (a) the
accused's belief arose from the accused's (i) self-induced intoxication, or (ii) recklessness or wilful
blindness; or (b) the accused did not take reasonable steps, in the circumstances known to the accused
at the time, to ascertain that the complainant was consenting; 1992, c. 38, s. 1.
9 Section 273.2 does not create a defence but merely identifies circumstances in which the
common
law defence of "belief in consent" (mistake of fact) may not be used. The section is therefore a statutory
bar. The circumstances listed in section 273.2 are not new grounds for disallowing the "defence" of
belief in consent based on mistake of fact; all are recognized at common law and under section 265(4)
as circumstances in which the defence is unavailable because it could not result in a lawful acquittal.
"Mistake" about a material fact negatives mens rea, an element of the offence to be proven by
the Crown; it is not an affirmative "defence" as such.
See e.g. Don Stuart, Canadian CriminalLaw: A Treatise, 4th ed. (Toronto: Carswell,
2001) at
280-310; Don Stuart, "Ewanchuk:Asserting'No Means No' at the Expense of Fault and Proportionality
Principles" [1999] 22 C.R. (5th) 39.
12 See R v. Esau, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 777 at 813 [Esau],where Justice McLachlin, as she then was, in
dissent but not on this point, states that section 273.2(a)(ii) of the CriminalCode codifies the common
law bar against reliance on the defence of belief in consent by any accused whose belief in consent is
reckless or wilfully blind. See also Esau, (ibid. at 807-08, 813-17), which show that under the Canadian
common law the analytic focus remains on the subjective awareness of the accused and that the
"reasonable steps" provision in section 273.2(b) is to be read as an affirmation by Parliament of the
common law prohibition against "wilful blindness," not the creation of an objective test. Those reasons,
though written in dissent, deal with matters not addressed in the majority judgment by Major J.; they
were subsequently followed by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R v. Darrach (1998), 38 O.R. (3d) 1
(C.A.), Morden A.C.J.O. In XL v. Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330 at 357 [Ewanchuk], Major J., writing
the majority judgment, quoted and adopted the above referenced proposition from Esau, at 813 of the
dissent by McLachlin J., as she then was, which Major J. describes as a statement by "the Court."
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Experience with analysis of mens rea in sexual assault demonstrates
that the rhetorical impact of terms used in legal analysis cannot, and should
not, be ignored or discounted. The term "honest belief' continues to be
widely used in the broad, unqualified lay sense of the 1980s and continues
to have significant rhetorical force, despite the Court's clarification of the
term. Old attitudes linger in relation to sexual assault and perpetuate the
view that a "belief in consent" should always exonerate an accused. Indeed,
use of the term "honest belief' often serves to beg the question of culpable
awareness by diverting scrutiny away from whether the belief was reckless
or wilfully blind.
The result is conclusory reasoning, truncation of analysis of mens
rea in sexual assault, and errors that subvert justice in the courts. When
these outmoded views of the law also influence police and prosecutorial
decision making, the effects can be irreversible and tragic. The best
evidence for the proposition that the analytic focus in determinations of
criminal responsibility in sexual assault must shift from the accused's beliefs
to the facts of which the accused was aware are cases in which analysis of
culpability is truncated and conclusory as a consequence of an undue focus
on "belief in consent."

III.

R. v. MACFIE

R. v. MacFie13 is one such case, providing compelling evidence that
the doctrine of "honest belief in consent" continues to be a significant cause
of confusion and serious error at the trial level. MacFie's wife left him,
following a long history of physical and emotional abuse. In letters to her,
he acknowledged that she was afraid of him and did not want to see him
because he had abused her. Following many unsuccessful attempts to
persuade her to see him, he abducted her and drove to a gravel pit south of
Calgary. He parked, entered the back of his van, and had intercourse with
her two times. When he took her back to her brother's house, the police
were waiting. Her brother had noticed14 she was missing, found her shoe in
the parking lot, and called the police.
The next day she reluctantly provided the police with a written
statement, recording that she feared what her husband would do if he
found out that she had given a statement. Three days later her husband
killed her. At trial, her written statement provided the only evidence of her

13 R. v. MacFie (B.S.), [2001] 277 A.R. 86 (C.A.), McFadyen J. [MacFie]. The court allowed
the
Crown's appeal from the trial acquittal and entered a conviction.
14 Ibid. at 88-89.
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version of events. 15
That statement explained that she had not consented but had

"agreed" to have sexual intercourse with him only because she feared
bodily harm.

I went along with it because I was scared of what he would do if I tried to resist. I had sex
with him and said things to him like "I loved him" and "I was sorry" because I thought if he
stayed calm and happy he wouldn't hurt me.

I told him I would have sex with him as it was the only was [sic] I could16think of to keep him
calm. I think I made him believe that it was what I really wanted too.

In a police interview after his arrest for her murder, MacFie stated
that she had initiated the sexual activity. He became angry at the mention
of the sexual assault allegation and said that if she made such an allegation
to the police, she deserved to die, and he would do the twenty-five years. 7
At trial, MacFie plead guilty to abduction and other offences, and
not guilty to charges of sexual assault and first-degree murder. He did not
testify, and was convicted of first-degree murder, but acquitted on the
sexual assault charge. 18 The trial judge held that although MacFie violently
abducted his estranged wife and had sexual intercourse with her without
her consent, he was not liable to be convicted of sexual assault because he
"truly and honestly believed that she was consenting to the activity."' 9
Sansregretv. The Queen a° andR v. Osolin,2' in which the accused's awareness
of lack of voluntariness in "consent" was also at issue, were not mentioned
by the trial judge.
15
16

Ibid.
Ibid. at 88.

17 Ibid. at 89.
18

Ibid.

19

Ibd. at 91.
20 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 570 [Sansregret]. See infra notes 36-48 and accompanying text.
21 [1993] 4 S.C.R. 595 [Osolin].
22 Police policy and protocols on domestic violence, abduction, kidnapping, and sexual assault, did
not result in the arrest of MacFie until after he murdered his estranged wife, Carol Meredith. The
police issued a warrant for MacFie's arrest when she reported her abduction from her brother's home
in Calgary. She then fled Calgary in an attempt to escape further harm. But three days later, before the
RCMP found him, MacFie found her at her sister's home in Cold Lake, Alberta. "Sentence Adds Years
to Killer's Term" CalgaryHerald (11 October 2001) A5. Again he abducted her, supposedly in a rage
over the sexual assault allegation. Her body was found a week later. "MacFie confessed to
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The reasons for judgment by Justice McFadyen, for the Alberta
Court of Appeal, on the appeal in MacFie stated the Crown's position:
an accused person who violently abducts his victim cannot rely on the defence of honest but
mistaken belief in consent where that victim, by reason of fear, seeks to persuade the
abductor that she agrees to the sexual activity he proposes.... [T]he abductor cannot escape
his knowledge of the circumstances in which the victim came to be with him and the
consequent finding of recklessness or wilful blindness which must arise from those
circumstances.2

In the reasons for judgment in MacFie, the Court of Appeal agreed
with the Crown and held:
while the abduction continues, the perpetrator of the abduction cannot assert an honest
belief in consent. Honest belief cannot exist in circumstances of wilful blindness or
recklessness and the perpetrator of a violent kidnapping or abduction can have no illusions
about the voluntariness of any expression of consent. 24

In the interval between the trial and the appeal, the Supreme Court
of Canada rendered its decisions in Ewanchuk25 and Davis.26 In all other
respects, the principal authorities available to both levels of court were the
same. The discussion of section 273.2 by Justice McLachlin, as she then
was, in dissent in Esau,27 was available, but not cited by the trial judge. 2
Instead, the trial judge directed his attention to the wife's statement that
she believed she had convinced the accused that she consented. The trial
judge did not consider the social context-the violent relationship and the
abduction-and its implications for voluntariness. 29 By contrast, Justice
McFadyen focused more broadly on context and held, correctly I submit,
that the trial judge erred in law in finding an "air of reality" for the defence
attack-Mountie" CalgaryHerald(6 May 1998) A4. Cases like MacFieexplain why many women believe
the rule of law often has little practical relevance for protection of their personal security, and see the
options to be submit, resist, escape, and when those options are impossible or fail, self-help. At the time
of MacFie's trial, one of Carol Meredith's brothers was an eighteen year RCMP veteran. "Murder trial
begins" CalgaryHerald (4 May 1998) A12. This woman was not a socially marginalized person, but the
police did not succeed in protecting her. She died a horrible death.
23 Supra note 13 at 87.
24 Ibid.
25 Supra note 12.
26
27
28

R. v. Davis, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 759 [Davis].
Supra note 12.
MacFie,supra note 13. The acquittal by Sanderman J. on the sexual assault charge was
May 12,

1998.
29 bid. at 91.
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of belief in consent without considering the evidence of circumstances
relevant to the issues of recklessness and wilful blindness.30
The appeal courts will undoubtedly have other opportunities to
revisit these issues. In doing so, the courts should avoid language that
evokes stale understandings of the law in this area. More than semantics is
at issue here.31 It has long been the case that where there is evidence to
suggest an accused may have believed there was consent, the spectre of
conviction of the "morally innocent" arises; that alone is widely seen to be
good and sufficient reason to acquit. This response, as shown at trial in
MacFie, has long confounded clear analysis of culpability in sexual assault
and enforcement of the law. In the background is the influence of
ambivalence in Canadian culture towards characterization of sexual activity
as assault.3 2 In such a cultural climate, the mere suggestion of "moral
innocence" easily suffices to truncate analysis and impede proper
application of the law. To curtail reliance by decision makers in the criminal
justice system on mere intuition and hunches shaped by cultural bias, we
need a fully articulated analysis of "moral innocence" and "culpable
awareness" in sexual assault.
IV.

PAPPAJOHNAND ITS LEGACY: A CAUTIONARY TALE

The reasons for judgment in Pappajohnand Sansregretwere crucial
for interpretation of the law of mens rea for the offence of sexual assault in
the period leading up to enactment of section 273.2 in 1992. Treatment of
the doctrine of "honest belief' in these cases is therefore useful in
interpreting section 273.2. These cases allow us to identify the conceptual
and logical traps and snares that confounded analysis of the significance of
"honest belief' for mens rea prior to the 1992 amendments, and provide
compelling evidence of the ease with which the term "honest belief"
subverts proper analysis of mens rea. The cases should therefore be read as
a "cautionary tale"; this is an instance in which there is probably
considerable truth to the adage that those who do not know history are
doomed to repeat it, despite the measures taken in the interim to clarify the
law.
30

Ibid. at 91-92.

31 Were the issue "mere semantics," cases like MacFie would suggest that semantics
require more

attention. What is ultimately at issue here, however, is reconfiguration of legal consciousness in relation
to issues of culpable awareness and criminal responsibility.
32 Discussion of Ewanchuk, supra note 12, illustrates this ambivalence. See Joanne Wright,
"Consent and Sexual Violence in Canadian Public Discourse: Reflections on Ewanchuk" (2001) 16:2
C.J.L.S. 173.
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The legacy of Pappajohn is like a shadow at dawn-out of
proportion to the thing itself. The reasons for judgment simply affirm that
in a sexual assault case the accused is to be given the benefit of any
reasonable doubt on the issue of mens rea that arises as a consequence of
a credible claim of mistake of fact about consent, subject to the usual
requirement that such a claim must be supported by evidence sufficient to
give it an air of reality. This proposition is straightforward and does not
suggest a revolution in the law of mens rea or the law of evidence in relation
to mens rea. Had the Supreme Court of Canada intended to effect a major
reinterpretation of the law of mens rea in Pappajohn, the reasons for
judgment would have contained a searching analysis and discussion of the
implications of such a reinterpretation. The judgment contains no such
discussion, however, nor any other indication that the members of the
Court had a doctrinal revolution in mind. Instead, the judgment simply
affirms the applicability of established mens rea doctrine to the offence of
rape, as it then was.33
All members of the Court, with the exception of Justice Martland,
adopted the reasons in dissent by Justice Dickson, but with respect to one
point only-that "mistake of fact" is a defence in sexual assault even if the
mistake is "unreasonable." Justice Dickson, Justice Estey concurring, would
have allowed the appeal on the ground that there was a sufficient basis in
the evidence to support the possibility that Pappajohn had a mistaken belief
in consent and the defence should have been placed before the jury. But
Justice McIntyre, for the majority, held that on the evidence the sole issue
was whether there was consent. The majority was not persuaded that there
was a sufficient evidentiary basis for Pappajohn's claim of mistaken belief
in consent; his appeal was not allowed. The legal point authoritatively
determined in Pappajohn-thatevidence supporting the possibility of
honest mistaken belief in consent may negative mens rea, even when the
mistake is unreasonable-is important for clarification of mens rea in sexual
assault, but is, nonetheless, relatively innocuous, not revolutionary.
In Pappajohn, Justice Dickson states, "a mistake that negatives
intention or recklessness entitles the accused to an acquittal. 3 4 But his
Pappajohn,supra note 4. Nevertheless, in the 1980s some appeal court justices curtailed
recklessness as a meaningful aspect of culpability in mens rea offences by applying broad interpretations
of the reasons by Dickson J., as he then was, in Pappajohn.This development purportedly reflected a
change in interpretation of the law of mens rea, but as noted above, no such shift in mens rea doctrine
is attributable to Pappajohn.
34
Ibid. at 148. By contrast, ibid. at 146, Dickson J. said: "In summary, intention or recklessness
must be proven in relation to all elements of the offence, including absence of consent. This simply
extends to rape the same general order of intention as in other crimes." Commentators appear to have
overlooked this remark.
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reasons do not discuss the difference between the implications of mistake
for a mens rea of intention and knowledge, as opposed to recklessness or
wilful blindness. Nor do the reasons define "honest belief." Nonetheless,
subsequently it was widely assumed that a mistaken belief negativing
intention necessarily negatives recklessness. One commentator argued that
if logic governs, mistaken belief must negate wilful blindness as well. 35 By
contrast, I suggest that in using the phrase "intention or recklessness,"
rather than "intention and recklessness," Justice Dickson expressed himself
imprecisely, inviting the very confusion that followed. Ironically, he appears
to have simply quoted and then adopted the phrase "intention or
recklessness" from a passage by Glanville Williams. In short, with hindsight
it is clear that the dissent in Pappajohn lacked clarity.
Sansregret played a pivotal role in shaping subsequent judicial
36 The trial judge
interpretation of the reasons for judgment in Pappajohn.
in Sansregret observed that it was "a very odd case,, 37 though numerous
studies document significant levels of domestic violence and coercion in
Canadian society.38 At trial in Sansregret, the apparent impediment to
conviction for rape was the accused's "honest belief' that the complainant
consented and that her consent was not the result of fear induced by his
own violent behaviour. The trial judge described the accused as someone
who demonstrated "clarity and shrewdness ...
in securing his own safety"
and then, influenced by "his own wishes," went "wilfully blind to the
obvious shortly thereafter." She observed that the absence of meaningful
consent due to fear would have been obvious to any one "in his right mind,"
but held that "the ratio of Pappajohnis clear and it leaves me no alternative
but to acquit., 39 She appeared to view the legal rule to be that where the
evidence supports the conclusion that the accused could have had an honest
mistaken belief in consent, intention, recklessness, and wilful blindness are
negatived, and the accused must be acquitted. She provided no original
analysis of the legal implications of evidence of honest belief for culpable
35 See Manson, supra note
7 at 195.
36 The courts at all levels in Sansregretcontributed to subsequent confusion. When Sansregretwas
cited as binding authority on the relationships between mistaken belief, recklessness, and wilful
blindness, the effect was often ambiguity.
371L v. Sansregret(1983), 34 C.R. (3d) 162 at 163 (Man. Co. Ct.),
Krindle J.
38
Statistics Canada, Victimization Survey (1993); Statistics Canada, GeneralSocial Survey (1999);
Ministers Responsible for the Status of Women,Assessing Violence Against Women: a StatisticalProfile
(Ottawa: Status of women, 2002). Domestic violence cases often involve assailants who lack self-control
and are angry or overwrought, and subsequently claim not to have perceived the circumstances, their
impact on the victims, or the significance of the victims' conduct.
39
Supra note 37 at 168.
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awareness in the form of recklessness or wilful blindness, but clearly hoped

the Crown would appeal her decision.4 °
In the appeal in Sansregret, the issue was whether the defence of
mistake of fact was available in law. Justice Matas found the claim of
4
"honest belief' in consent to have no "air of reality" in the circumstances, '
while Justice Huband held that to be relevant the "honest belief' must
relate to the impact of the threats and violence on the subsequent choices
made by the complainant.4 2 Both justices allowed the appeal and entered
a conviction. Justice Philip dissented on the ground that the accused's
"honest belief' that consent was genuine, not extorted, negated mens rea,
and, therefore, the trial judge had not erred in law.43

In the Supreme Court of Canada, the majority in Sansregretinvoked
Pappajohn.Justice McIntyre adopted the view of Justice Huband that, in
a case of extorted consent, mens rea is in relation to the effect of threats or
fear of bodily harm. To operate as a "defence," the alleged "honest belief'

must encompass belief that consent is voluntary, not the product of violence
or threats of violence. The Court arguably invited confusion, however,
when it adopted, without analysis, the proposition that an "honest belief'
that an extorted consent was voluntary "would negate the mens rea under
143(b)(i) of the Code and entitle the accused to an acquittal." 44 Here the
40 Sansregret's awareness of the facts arguably provided ample support for a finding of mens rea
on the ground of wilful blindness and recklessness. "Belief" was therefore irrelevant to the outcome,
(see infra notes 56-62 and accompanying text). Similarly, the complainant's belief that Sansregret
"honestly believed" that she "really" consented confirms neither the substance nor the "sincerity" of
the accused's belief. The accused's attention likely focused on whether her attitude implied a threat to
his safety and security, not on whether her consent and the reconciliation were voluntary. He may well
have believed that she was back under his sexual or social control and he need not fear she would go
to the police. These may have been his only concerns, and both of them might well have described his
belief about what she would do in this regard as a belief that she "consented."
However, only voluntary consent is valid consent at common law. Sansregret thus provides what
is arguably a classic example of reliance by an accused on a mistake of law. Section 19 of the Criminal
Code prohibits reliance on ignorance of the law (and mistake of law) as an excuse to deny criminal
responsibility. See Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985 c. C-34, s. 19. The prohibition is of long-standing.
Nonetheless, when Sansregretwas before the courts in the early 1980s,prosecutors did not use mistake
of law arguments in response to defences based on "mistaken beliefs in consent." See Lucinda
Vandervort, "Mistake of Law and Sexual Assault: Consent and Mens Rea" (1987-88) 2 C.J.W.L. 233.
The dissenting judgment by Fraser C.J. in R. v. Ewanchuk (1998), 13 C.R. (5th) 324 (Alta. C.A.), was
the first Canadian judgment to apply the mistake of fact/mistake of law distinction to the defence of
mistaken belief in consent. See also, Major J. in Ewanchuk, supra note 12 at page 356-57. It was also
applicable, though not used, in MacFie, supra note 13.
41 R.v. Sansregret (1983), 37 C.R. (3d) 45 at 48-53 (Man. C.A.).
42 Ibid. at 54-57.
43

Ibid. at 57-66.

44 Sansregret,supra note 20 at 581.
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term "honest belief' is used as if "honesty" excludes awareness of a risk
that the complainant is not a voluntary agent. This illustrates the problems
caused by use of the term "honest belief." Indeed, this aspect of the reasons
for judgment in Sansregretprovides a leading example of truncation and
error in analysis of mens rea caused by the peremptory conclusion that the
accused had an "honest belief in consent." MacFie exemplifies the same
error at the trial level, confirming-as argued above-that conclusory
reasoning has survived the 1992 amendments to the sexual assault
provisions in the CriminalCode.
The possibility that an accused believed consent was voluntary will
give rise to reasonable doubt as to culpable knowledge. Within the
framework of subjective liability, however, recklessness requires not
knowledge, but merely awareness of a risk and a choice to run th risk.
Whether the attitude toward the risk is contempt, indifference, or thrillseeking is unimportant. Given that knowledge that the circumstances are
inculpatory is not required for conviction, it is quite possible for an accused,
who may have indeed believed consent to be voluntary, to be convicted on
the ground that he or she was nonetheless aware the belief might be
mistaken. In other words, evidence of mistake of fact sufficient to support
the possibility that the accused held an exculpatory belief, does not
necessarily negate a mens rea of recklessness or wilful blindness.4 5
It is apparent that Justice McIntyre's reading of the facts in
Sansregret, like that by Justice Huband in the court below, supported a
finding of recklessness. Justice McIntyre stated:
one would have thought that a man who intimidates and threatens a woman ... would know
that the consent was obtained as a result of the threats. If specific knowledge of the nature
of the consent was not attributable to him ... at the very least recklessness would be.... [T]his
case could have been disposed of on the basis of recklessness. The trial judge ... did not do
so because of her application of the "mistake of fact" defence.'

45 Indeed McIntyre J., in a rarely quoted but significant passage in Sansregret,ibid.
at 587, remarks
that an accused may have "an honest belief, in the sense that he has no specific knowledge to the
contrary" and yet not have a defence because he is "deliberately blind" [emphasis added]. See also
Anthony Kenny, FreewillandResponsibility (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978) at 57-64 [Kenny].
In his critique of the ruling in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Morgan, [1975] 2 All E.R. 347
(H.L.)-that evidence of honest belief in consent, even an unreasonable belief, could negate the mens
rea required for conviction-Kenny observes that although an honest belief in consent negatives intent
to have intercourse without consent, such a belief "does not necessarily negate the intent to have
intercourse willy-nilly, i.e. the intent to have intercourse whether or not she consents" (ibid. at 61). This
is consistent with the view that an "honest belief" can co-exist with awareness that the belief may be
mistaken.
46 Sansregret, ibid. at 582.
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on
Justice McIntyre then reviewed the "abundance of evidence ...
47
which a finding of recklessness could have been made. But for Justice

McIntyre's ruling that Pappajohnprecluded conviction of Sansregret on the
ground of recklessness, he likely would have affirmed the conviction on the
ground that an honest belief in consent did not necessarily negate a mens
rea of recklessness towards the validity of the consent.
Instead, Justice Mclntrye used the alternate ground of wilful
blindness to uphold the conviction in the case. This aspect of the reasons
in Sansregret has been the object of much critical comment on the ground
that wilful blindness, like recklessness, requires an awareness of risk. If one
assumes that "honest belief in consent" precludes awareness of risk, it
follows that credible evidence of "honest belief in consent" precludes
finding that an accused made a deliberate choice to remain ignorant of the
existence of the prohibited circumstance, absent consent. One influential
Canadian commentator on the decision in Sansregret even argued that
logical consistency demands that honest belief exonerates or absolves. 8
Were that true, the effect in general intent offences would be to define "an
honest exculpatory belief" as a belief that is neither dishonest, nor reckless,
nor wilfully blind. That is indeed now the effective definition in Canada at
common law and pursuant to section 273.2-an "honest belief" is

exculpatory only if it is neither reckless nor wilfully blind. In 1985, however,
the emphasis was on the honesty (not defined) of the belief, and not on
whether the belief was reckless or wilfully blind.
The decision in Sansregretstands. It has been much criticized on the
ground that wilful blindness, like recklessness, requires awareness that
consent may be absent or invalid, and must therefore, like recklessness, be
47

Ibid.

48 Manson, supra note 7 at 195. But see Kenny, supra note 45 at 63, who observes, "an honest
belief in consent is in no way incompatible with recklessness about consent; and if that is so an honest
but unreasonable belief in consent will not always negate mens rea in rape." And further, "[i]t
is surely
perfectly possible that a man might believe that a woman consented while knowing, from the
circumstances of the case, that there was a risk that she did not." It is thus apparent that the English and
Canadian legal systems have struggled with similar controversies in relation to analysis of culpable
awareness in sexual assault over the last three decades. In the instant context it should be noted,
however, that Kenny, in writing the above quoted passages in 1978, used the term "honest belief" in the
same loosely defined and equivocal manner in which it was commonly used by Canadian jurists prior
to the 1997 decision in Esau. I suggest that the English experience with these issues confirms that the
rhetorical impact of the phrase "honest belief" confuses jurists and interferes with proper analysis of
mens rea.
In England and Wales, this problem continues. See e.g. B. (A Minor) v. Director of Public
Prosecutions, [20001 2 A.C. 428 (H.L.); R v. G & Another, [2003] U.K.H.L. 50, 4 All E.R. 765,
reaffirming a traditional "orthodox" subjective approach to mens rea (the latter repudiating the Caldwell
approach to recklessness). To respond to public outcry over judicial treatment of mens rea issues in
sexual assault cases, legislation was recently enacted-see Sexual Offences Act 2003, c. 42.
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unavailable as a ground for conviction whenever there is evidence with "an
air of reality" sufficient to support a claim of mistake. 49 The question that
should be asked, however, is: Does evidence of mistake that supports an
allegedly honest belief in consent, and is sufficient to negative a finding of
intent to pursue a sexual activity with knowledge of the absence of valid
consent, also necessarily negative a finding that the accused was aware that
consentmight nonetheless be absentor invalid?After the Supreme Court of
Canada rendered its decision in Sansregret, members of the judiciary
probably had limited opportunities to consider that question precisely
because prosecutors, police, and persons advising potential complainants
believed that the decisions in Pappajohn and Sansregrethad resolved the
issue.
R. v. Weaver is one of the few reported cases decided subsequent to
Sansregret in which the Crown appealed following an accused's successful
use of a defence of honest mistaken belief in consent. The Court of Appeal
observed that the trial judge's conclusion that the accused may have had an
honest belief in consent was "a remarkable finding."5 ° Nonetheless, the
49"Recklessness," discussed here, is "advertent recklessness,"
not "recklessness" based on an
objective test. In a case comment on the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Sansregret, Professor
Allan Manson states, "An exculpatory mistake of fact requires a finding of honest belief, which cannot
coexist with a concomitant conclusion that the accused was wilfully blind as to the element in issue. The
former is an honest but mistaken belief in whiteness, while the latter is a strong suspicion--deliberately
unconfirmed-of blackness." See Manson, ibid. at 195. This comment is widely quoted in discussions
of the case and continues to be influential in shaping comments in the literature about belief in consent
under Canadian law. See e.g. Don Stuart, "Ewanchuk:Asserting 'No Means No' at the Expense of Fault
and Proportionality Principles," Case Comment (1999) 22 C.R. (5th) 39 at 48. 1 submit that the Manson
approach rests on a simple tautology, valid by definition if the meaning of each element of the equation
is strictly observed. When decision makers try to use it as a guide in deliberating about the evidence,
conclusory reasoning and error often result.
Infra notes 57-62, 70-72, and 94-95, I argue that a focus on awareness of facts is preferable because
it will result in verdicts based on evidence of the accused's culpable awareness rather than on the
credibility of exculpatory beliefs. Determinations of credibility are subject to influence by prejudice and
are arguably a source of discrimination in the criminal justice system. Decision makers who regard the
credibility of "honest beliefs" as determinative may give only cursory attention to the balance of the
evidence. Over time, the result may be a set of working assumptions, a courthouse culture that tends
to deny socially disadvantaged accused equal protection of the law at each successive decision-making
point in the criminal justice process. This phenomenon may be a partial explanation for the disparity
between the "cleared by charge" rates in sexual assault cases in New Brunswick (38 per cent) and the
Northwest Territories (72 per cent), reported in data from 1988. See Scott Clark & Dorothy Hepworth,
"Effects of Reform Legislation on the Processing of Sexual Assault Cases" in Julian V. Roberts &
Renate M. Mohr, eds., Confronting Sexual Assault: A Decade of Legal and Social Change (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1994) 113 at 126. See also the comments of Allan Manson in Allan Manson
& Tom Quigley, "Bernard on Intoxication: Principle, Policy and Points in Between-Two Comments"
(1989) 67 C.R. (3d) 168 at 178, for an example of an attack on an accused's credibility in response to
the assertion of an honest belief in consent.
50 K v. Weaver (1990), 110 A.R. 396, 80 C.R. (3d) 396 (Alta. C.A.) at 400 [Weaver cited to C.R.].
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court deferred to the trial judge on this issue and upheld the acquittal,
describing the Crown's claim that the trial judge erred in law in ruling that
the defence of mistaken belief in consent was available on the facts of the
case as "an invitation to retry the case on its facts, a process not open to us.
It was another example of the beguiling way in which a question of fact may
be disguised as a question of law."5 1 The Crown did not appeal further.
In its 1998 decision in Ewanchuk, the Alberta Court of Appeal
followed its decision in Weaver, again rejecting the Crown's argument that
on the facts of the case a defence of mistaken belief in consent was
unavailable in law, and upheld the acquittal at trial. In Ewanchuk however,
the Crown appealed, and the Court of Appeal was overruled by the
Supreme Court of Canada, affirming that the availability of a defence is an
appealable question of law.52 The effect is to affirm that the discretion of
judges to characterize questions of law as questions of fact, and thereby
insulate trial verdicts from appellate review, is limited as a matter of law.53
By contrast, the effect of the 1990 appeal decision in Weaver was to
confirm that when there was evidence to support a belief in consent,
however unreasonable, the result might be acquittal, not subject to appeal.
This would have encouraged police and prosecutors to assume that any
evidence giving an "air of reality" to a claim of "honest belief in consent"
was sufficient reason to decline to prosecute a sexual assault case.
Prosecutors do not proceed to trial unless a conviction appears "likely," and
judges only hear cases brought to trial. Complaints based on evidence that
provided some support for an accused's claim of belief in consent were
probably more likely to be classified as "unfounded" or "cleared without
charge." These factors would have ensured that after the decisions in
Pappajohn and Sansregret,judges had limited opportunities to reconsider
the implications of honest mistaken belief in consent for culpability in
sexual assault.54 Moreover, between 1985 and 1992, the exculpatory effects
Ibid. at 399.
52

Supra note 12 at paras. 21-22, referring to Belyea v. The King, [1932] S.C.R. 279 at 296, Anglin

C.J..
53 But for the decision on this point in Ewanchuk, the Crown might not have appealed the
acquittal at trial in MacFie, supra note 13.
Review (by the author) of reported cases decided in the years between 1980 and 1992
shows
that some cases involving the defence of "belief in consent" did proceed to trial. Yet judges seized with
these cases rarely appeared impressed with the evidentiary support for belief in consent and usually
categorized them as cases in which the belief in consent defence was unavailable and the only issue was
consent. On appellate review, convictions in these cases tended to be upheld, on the ground that the
evidence provided no "air of reality" to the belief. Weaver, supra note 50, discussed in the text
accompanying supra notes 50-53, is exceptional. In Weaver, a mistaken belief in consent led to an
acquittal at trial, upheld on appeal. This was unusual. In many cases involving some actual evidence to
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of honest beliefs, in general, were not closely scrutinized by judges. When
analyzing the implications of honest belief in the existence of exculpatory
circumstances for mens rea in offences other than sexual assault, judges
often simply applied what they referred to as the Pappajohn/Sansregret
"doctrine."55 Crown counsel were probably reluctant to relitigate these
issues during that period.
The evidence thus suggests that the implications of "honest belief"
for mens rea in sexual assault confounded many Canadian jurists,
academics, and lawyers in recent years. I suggest that much of the confusion
was due to a lack of precision in the definition and use of the phrase
"honest belief," which allowed non-legal rhetorical overtones to subvert the
law. If jurists adopt clear definitions and use them systematically, it should
now be possible to close that chapter in Canadian legal history. Errors in

the characterization of questions of fact and questions of law that affect
rulings on availability of the defence of belief in consent under section
265(4) are appealable questions of law.5 6

support "mistake" no charges would have been laid. In the event of charges and a trial leading to
acquittal on the ground of "mistake of fact," the Crown generally would not have appealed.
The primary effect of the "honest belief doctrine" was thus probably not at trial or on appeal, but
instead as it increased the proportion of complaints labeled "unfounded," "cleared without charges,"
or not prosecuted, because police or prosecutors believed that the accused's claim of either consent or
an honest belief in consent was likely to provide a "credible defence" and therefore the charge was "not
likely" to result in conviction. This may be a partial explanation for what appear to have been
comparatively low rates of reporting, classification as "founded," and prosecution in rape cases.
Complete statistics for this period are not available, but see R. Gunn & C. Minch, "Unofficial and
Official Response to Sexual Assault" (1985-86) 14 Resources for Fern. Research 47, reporting on
attrition rates; Julian V. Roberts & Michelle G. Grossman, "Changing Definitions of Sexual Assault:
An Analysis of Police Statistics" in Roberts & Mohr, supra note 49, 57 at 57-83, reporting an increase
in the cases reported to police after the 1983 reforms to the sexual assault laws; and Scott Clark &
Dorothy Hepworth, "Effects of Reform Legislation on the Processing of Sexual Assault Cases" in
Roberts & Mohr,supra note 49, 113 at 113-35, reporting no change in the percentage of cases classified
as "founded" or "cleared by laying of a charge" (ibid.at 126) despite the increase in complaints in 1983
and subsequent years. Roberts & Mohr noted that change in the law does not ensure that social and
professional reaction will change (ibid.at 57). The Statistics Canada Victimization Survey (1993) found
that about 94 per cent of sexual assaults are unreported; 40 per cent of reported cases result in charges;
of those, about two-thirds result in convictions. And see Jeanne Gregory & Sue Lees, "In Search of
Gender Justice: Sexual Assault and the Criminal Justice System" (1994) 48 Fem. Rev. 80. Overall,
studies suggest that the criminal justice system's handling of reported sexual assault cases was slow to
change following the 1983 reforms and change did not occur uniformly.
55 See R v. Sandhu (1989), 50 C.C.C. (3d) 492 (Ont. C.A.) and R v. Zundel (1987), 31 C.C.C. (3d)
97 (Ont. C.A.).
56 Supra notes 52, 53, and accompanying text. The position advanced in this article should be
applicable whenever a purportedly exculpatory belief based on mistake of fact is raised to negative mens
rea in a general intent offence; a detailed examination of the doctrinal implications for offences other
than sexual assault is beyond the scope of this article.
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Honest Beliefs, Credible Lies
CULPABLE AWARENESS AND BELIEF: A RESTATEMENT

Under present law, culpability in sexual assault is not grounded on
the sexual activity as such, but on the choice to undertake the activity
despite awareness that the circumstances are or may be inculpatory, or, in
other words, a choice to act with knowledge of non-consent or without
knowledge of consent. Where an accused's knowledge of consent is
equivocal-a mixture of belief that there is valid consent and awareness
that this may not be the case-fault or blameworthiness does not attach to
the accused's uncertainty about consent, but rather to the decision to
engage in the sexual activity despite awareness of that uncertainty. Reliance
on a belief that is neither duplicitous, reckless, nor wilfully blind (and thus
free of any practical possibility of error) that "voluntary agreement" or
consent has been communicated by a person acting with legal capacity is
not blameworthy. In such a case, there is no culpability for sexual assault,
unless the circumstances vitiate the validity of communicated consent, and
the accused is reckless or wilfully blind towards the impact of those
circumstances on the voluntariness of the agreement or the capacity of the
complainant, or is mistaken about what constitutes "consent" in law
pursuant to section 273.1.
The common law proposition underlying the provisions enacted in
section 273.2 is that evidence of a belief in consent, sufficient to negative
proof of intent to assault by raising reasonable doubt that the accused knew
there was no consent, does not necessarily negative recklessness or wilful
blindness, subjectively determined, with respect to consent. Whenever the
defence is belief in consent, the crucial issue to be determined is whether
the accused was aware of a fact inconsistent with voluntary communication
of valid consent. If the accused was aware of such a fact, any belief in
consent was reckless or wilfully blind, at best. Such a belief affords the
accused no defence, and therefore its credibility is irrelevant to the legal
outcome-no matter what fond (or self-serving) beliefs or hopes about
consent the accused had.
These propositions are sound, empirically and in law. A belief can,
and often does, coexist in consciousness with awareness that the belief may
be mistaken. This is a simple and uncontroversial statement of fact about
the cognitive capacity of human beings.57 Law requires adults to utilize their
57 See Josef Pemer, Understandingthe RepresentationalMind (Cambridge: MIT Press,
1991) on
the development of cognitive abilities and evidence that the typical four year old child is able to
appreciate that the content and referent of mental states may not match one another, the content of a
belief may not represent reality, and a belief may be "false." Paradoxically, young children may examine
their beliefs more frequently than some adults do because children are still constructing a basic view
of the world. Children may therefore rely on entrenched habits and assumptions about their
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capacities for critical examination of their beliefs when the actions they take
or fail to take in reliance on those same beliefs affect the legally protected
interests of other persons. This is a non-controversial legal proposition. It

is therefore apparent that a "mistaken belief' in consent does not
necessarily "absolve" or "exonerate" an accused charged with sexual
assault.5 8 If the legal significance of the facts of which the accused was

aware is inconsistent with the proposition that the complainant
communicated5 9 consent to the sexual activity, voluntarily, and with full
legal capacity, the accused is liable to be convicted. A finding that the
accused may have also had a "mistaken belief in consent" does not alter the
result.60 On examination, moreover, such a belief will often prove to be a

mistake about the law of consent, not a mistake about the facts.
Mens rea in sexual assault thus depends on the accused's subjective
awareness of material facts, not the accused's beliefs. Material facts are
primary-they provide the foundation for beliefs, including beliefs about
material circumstances, such as the presence or absence of valid consent.
Beliefs are secondary-they may be well-grounded and correct, or only
partially validated and mistaken. Failure to appreciate the legal significance
of known facts in forming a belief about consent is a mistake of law, not an
excuse. 61 The accused person, whose sole defence is to allege that he or she
environment and other people less often than many adults do. Yet, despite their reliance on habituated
patterns of thought, adults remain capable of the complex cognitive behaviour required to test and
revise beliefs and they often use this capacity when they are in situations they recognize as "risky" or
otherwise uncertain. See also Kenny, supra notes 45, 48.
58 Availability of the mistake of fact defence is a question of law. There must be some evidence
to support the claim of mistake and the mistake must have an "air of reality" in the whole of the
circumstances. See Osolin, supra note 21; R. v. Park,[1995] 2 S.C.R. 836 [Park]; Emily Steed, "Reality
Check: The Sufficiency Threshold to the Air of Reality Test in Sexual Assault Cases" (1994) 36 C.L.Q.
448-73; and, more recently, the review of the "air of reality" test as a test for sufficiency of the evidence
in relation to a number of defences over the last couple of decades, in R. v. Cinous, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 3.
See also R_v. Fontaine,[2004] 1 S.C.R. 702 [Fontaine], Fish J., applying Cinous.
59
Park,ibid. at 57, L'Heureaux J., adopted by Major J. in Ewanchuk, supra note 12 at 353-55.
See
also Stephen G. Coughlan, Annotation ofR. v. Ewanchuk, [1999] 22 C.R. (5th) 1 at 6.
60 See R v. Thiroux, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 5 [Throux], involving the analogous question of whether an
honest belief that financial deprivation would not be a consequence of an investment project, is a
defence to fraud charges under s. 380(1)(a). Writing for the Court, McLachlin J., as she then was,
stated: "the inference of subjective knowledge of the risk can be drawn from the facts as the accused
believed them to be" (ibid. at 21). Belief that no loss will occur is irrelevant for culpability (ibid. at 2526).
61 Esau, supra note 12 at 807-08; Ewanchuk, supra note 12 at 356-57; Criminal Code,supra note
1, s. 19. See also Vandervort, supra note 40, arguing that some beliefs are mistakes about what the law
of consent is, or about how it is be interpreted and applied to the facts. As a matter of law, such beliefs
do not excuse the accused; they are mistakes of law, not fact. The result is to limit the range of cases in
which the "defence" of mistake of fact is applicable and to ensure that the legal definition of consent
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relied on a belief in "consent" defined other than as in law, has made a
mistake about the law and is liable to be convicted.62
The assertion that a mistaken belief about the circumstances
material to an essential element of a general intent offence does not
necessarily preclude a finding of culpability on the ground of recklessness
or wilful blindness, thus flows directly from fundamental principles of
criminal law. This is the basis for the statutory bar in section 273.2 against
availability of the defence of belief in consent when the belief is due to
recklessness or wilful blindness. An individual who believes the other party
is a willing participant, but who knows that communication of consent (that
is, voluntary agreement, by words or conduct) is ambiguous, can hardly be
said to lack awareness (in the absence of incapacity) of that fact. If that
individual nonetheless chooses to engage in sexual activity with the other
person, he or she acts with what the law defines (at best) as a "reckless"
state of mind and therefore has the mens rea or subjective fault required in
law for conviction of sexual assault. Likewise, the individual who perseveres
without inquiry, though aware of reason to suspect that consent, though
communicated, may not be voluntary or capable, is liable to be convicted
on grounds of wilful blindness. In each case, mens rea is subjectively
determined. By barring reliance on the defence of belief in consent where
the belief is due to the accused's recklessness or wilful blindness, section
273.2 ensures that when a belief in consent is raised in defence of an
accused, the accused's subjective awareness of the material facts is analyzed
in accordance with the law of mens rea in sexual assault and verdicts are not
pre-determined by the credibility of the alleged belief in consent. 63 To
permit an accused to rely on a reckless or wilfully blind belief in consent
would invite error. Section 273.2 precludes that eventuality.
Belief in consent to sexual contact remains a common law defence
based on the defence of mistake of fact, not a statutory "defence. 64
Sections 265(4) and 273.2 do not change the substantive law, but instead
is applied.
62

Ewanchuk, ibid. at 356-57.

63 See Manson in Manson & Quigley, supra note 49 at 178, for an example of an attack on an
accused's credibility in response to the assertion of an honest belief in consent. By contrast, I suggest
that reliance on the bare credibility of an accused's belief in consent can only exacerbate the effects of
bias and undermine impartiality in the administration of justice.
64 Section 265(4) of the CriminalCode, supra note 1, codifies the common
law test for sufficiency
of evidence (used to determine the availability of a defence in law) and provides jury instructions for
cases where the credibility of an accused's assertion of honest belief must be assessed; the subsection
does not "enact" a "statutory" defence of honest belief. Similarly, s. 273.2 is not a codification of mens
rea in sexual assault but rather a statutory bar stating when the common law defence of belief in consent
is not available as a matter of law.
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provide instructions that should reduce the errors that occur in sexual
assault cases whenjudges and triers of fact, distracted by the subject matter,
deviate from ordinary procedures and reasoning in the deliberation
process. The proposition that, but for the enactment of section 273.2, a
belief in consent would completely exonerate or absolve an accused
charged with sexual assault at common law, does not withstand scrutiny. A
mere belief in consent always was a "bad excuse." It still is. The Supreme

Court of Canada is quite clear on this point.
In Esau, Justice McLachlin, as she then was (in dissent but not on
this point), observed:
A person is not entitled to take ambiguity as the equivalent of consent. If a person, acting
honestly and without wilful blindness, perceives his companion's conduct as ambiguous or
unclear, his duty is to abstain or obtain clarification on the issue of consent. This appears to
be the rule at common law.
I note that Parliament has affirmed this common sense proposition in enacting s. 273.2,
which states that "[i]t is not a defence to a charge [of sexual assault] that the accused believed
that the complainant consented to the activity that forms the subject-matter of the charge,
where ... the accused did not take reasonable steps, in the circumstances known to the
accused at the time, to ascertain that the complainant was consenting." ... The question is
whether the defendant at bar, properly attentive to the issue of consent (i.e., not wilfully
blind), could have, in the light of the ambiguity, honestly65concluded that the complainant had
the capacity and was consenting to the sexual activity.

65

Supra note 12 at 813-14. I suggest it is unlikely an accused could fail to take steps to ascertain

consent that were "reasonable," in view of the facts of which he or she was aware, and not be reckless
or wilfully blind towards consent. An accused will inevitably be barred from reliance on belief in consent
pursuant to s. 273.2(a)(ii) and (b) of the CriminalCode. Section 273.2(b) provides a formula for use in
determining whether the accused was "wilfully blind." When the accused fails to ascertain consent,
despite awareness of facts inconsistent with valid consent as defined in s. 273.1, a belief in consent is
wilfully blind, at best, and not available as a defence. When none of the conditions set out in s. 273.2
apply to bar reliance on a defence of belief in consent, the principles of subjective liability in sexual
assault at common law are applied to assess culpability. Typically, a trial judge will be able to determine
whether the "air of reality" test in s. 265(4) is met and the defence is available, by applying the legal
definitions of recklessness and wilful blindness to the evidence viewed in the light most favourable to
the accused. If the test is not met, that is the end of the matter-the defence is not available. If the test
is met, the "reasonable steps" provision in s. 273.2(b) provides the trier of fact with a formula
(comparable in function to the "reasonable grounds" formula in s. 265(4)) to use in determining
whether the evidence shows the accused to have been wilfully blind, in fact, towards the issue of consent,
and thus culpably aware and therefore clearly not entitled to rely on the defence of belief in consent.
(The test remains subjective, see text accompanying infra note 99.) Section 273.2 is therefore not a
statutory definition of the mental element in sexual assault, but rather a statutory bar against availability
of the defence of belief in consent that is based on, and wholly consistent with, the common law. The
mental element for culpability in sexual assault remains uncodified, governed by common law principles
of subjective liability. The statutory bar functions to curtail error by prohibiting consideration of belief
in consent precisely when it is unavailable at common law.
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Justice McLachlin also stated that a belief that is reckless or wilfully
blind does not have an exculpatory effect at common law or as codified in
section 273.2(a)(ii). 66 This way of viewing the question reverses the previous
emphasis on the credibility of the alleged "honest belief' and arguably
dictates a fundamental change in how analysis of mens rea is to proceed.
Henceforth, the crucial question is whether the accused was reckless or
wilfully blind. Only an accused who is neither can be said to have an
"honest belief" in consent as an exculpatory circumstance, because "honest
belief' has no practical legal meaning in this context other than "a belief
that is neither reckless nor wilfully blind." To undertake sexual activity with
awareness that consent may not be voluntary and capable is to choose to act
with awareness that one is ignorant of a material circumstance. To do so,
though aware that the words and conduct communicating consent were
ambiguous, is to choose to act with wilful blindness, aware that one's
actions are reckless, at best. In either case, the sexual activity is unjustifiable
(as a matter of law) and, in both cases, the choice to undertake it is as
blameworthy as to do so with knowledge of express refusal. This conclusion
is neither novel nor revolutionary, but flows directly from a simple
application of general principles of subjective liability to the elements of the
offence of sexual assault, a general intent offence.
Two years later, writing for the Court in Ewanchuk, Justice Major
adopted the above noted position taken by Justice McLachlin in Esau and
stated: "to be honest the accused's belief cannot be reckless, willfully blind
or tainted by an awareness of any of the factors enumerated in subsections
273.1(2) and 273.2. " 67 This statement of the matter emphatically reaffirms
that the dominant analytic focus has flipped. The crux of the matter in
analysis of mens rea is not, "Did the accused have an 'honest belief in
consent'?" Instead the crucial question is, "Was the accused aware of any
reason to believe or suspect that consent was not present or not voluntary,
that the complainant lacked capacity, or that consent was tainted by any of
the factors enumerated in section 273.1(2) or vitiated at common law
pursuant to section 273.1(3)?" Culpability does not depend on the
credibility and sincerity of an accused's beliefs, but on the accused's
awareness of the facts material to the voluntary, capable communication of
consent as defined in section 273.1. A belief in consent, though credible and
perhaps even "actually," "sincerely,"or "genuinely" held by the accused,
may nonetheless be reckless or wilfully blind and therefore neither

66 Esau, supra note 12 at 813; see also Esau, supra note 12 at 807-08, 813-17; and Thdroux,
supra
note 60.
67
Supra note 12 at 361. The relevant section is 273.1(2). Section 273.2 enumerates no such factors.
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exculpatory, nor "honest," within the meaning of the common law.68
There is a risk, however, that the term "honest belief" will continue
to be used as it was in the 1980s and 1990s. The result will be the same old
errors in analysis of mens rea. The decision at trial in MacFie dramatically
exemplifies this phenomenon. 69 The errors, with one variation or another,
will occur as follows. The decision maker will first determine whether the
belief in consent might have been "honest," in the lay sense of "sincere,"
"actual," or "genuine." If so, the decision maker may assume, without
further consideration of the evidence, that the accused cannot be convicted
on the ground of either recklessness or wilful blindness and must be
acquitted. In an indeterminate number of cases, this will be a false
assumption; the accused will have been aware of facts and circumstances
that are inconsistent with the communication of consent, voluntariness, or
legal capacity as defined in law.7°
A fresh approach to analysis of culpability in sexual assault is
required to avoid such errors. Any approach that gives "belief in consent"
a pivotal role in analysis of the evidence will tend to evoke the old
paradigms and will often result in truncation of the analysis of mens rea.
Only a focus on awareness of facts can ensure a full analysis of mens rea in
relation to consent as defined in section 273.1. Because the accused is now
understood to be deemed to appreciate the legal significance of the facts of
which he or she is aware,71 it can no longer be assumed that culpability is
mediated by "beliefs about consent." Rather culpability must be
understood to be based on the accused's choice to commit the actus reus
with awareness of the facts material to consent as defined in section 273.1.
An accused's "beliefs about consent" may well be inconsistent with the legal
definition of consent and the accused may be unaware that his or her
actions violate the law. This may be a consideration in sentencing,
but-subject to limited exceptions that do not apply to sexual assault-an
accused's mistaken beliefs about the law are never relevant to deliberations
about culpability.72 Culpability is based on the accused's subjective
68

Esau, supra note 12 at 807-08, 813-17; Ewanchuk, supra note 12 at 355-59.

69 See text at supra notes 13-30.
70 See supra notes 48-49, and consider the example of X's belief that "Y is Z" though X is aware
of facts that are inconsistent with the proposition that "Y is Z." The problem is analogous to that in
Hodges's Case,Liverpool Summ. Assizes, 1838, but here the question is whether the belief is "honest,"
i.e. neither reckless nor wilfully blind, not whether the accused is the perpetrator.
71See Molis v. The Queen, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 356 at 362 [Molis].
72 At present, the CriminalCode offences affected by these exceptions include forcible
entry, s.
72; theft, s. 322; property offences, ss. 430-46; and defence of property, ss. 38-42. All the exceptions are
statutory and limited.
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awareness of the facts that the law, not the accused, defines as material to
"consent" pursuant to section 273.1.
The trial acquittal in MacFie provides clear evidence that the
defence of "belief in consent" continues to cause error. There are other
reasons to anticipate that the old assumptions may survive. For example,
in Ewanchuk, Justice Major stated that "to cloak the accused's actions in
moral innocence, the evidence must show that he believed that the
complainant communicated consent to engage in the sexual activity in
question. 73 Standing alone, out of context, this statement appears to equate
"belief in communicated consent" with "moral innocence." The common
view is that conviction of the "morally innocent" is "abhorrent, 7 4 the
epitome of injustice. Resonance between the terms "innocent," "honest,"
and "excused" helps further to explain why the rhetorical impact of the
term "honest belief' is so seductive, leading to conclusory reasoning, again
and again, as the impulse to be "fair" overwhelms rationality. The
exculpatory rhetorical power of the term is likely to continue to permit
assailants to present themselves as possible "moral innocents" (implying
that, if charged, they "should be" entitled to be acquitted) and cause the
legal meaning of the term "honest belief' as clarified in Esau and
Ewanchuk to be overlooked.7 5 The effect will be to undermine effective
enforcement of sexual assault laws, as it did in the past, by truncating
analysis of mens rea. This is almost inevitable if the assertion of a credible
"belief in consent"-which may be either a "sincere (albeit not necessarily
validated) belief' or a "credible lie," continues to be widely accepted as a
negation of recklessness and wilful blindness, rather than a red herring that
invites verdicts based on conclusory reasoning.
Affirmative steps are therefore required to block the subversive
rhetorical impact of the term "honest belief' in legal analysis. For here, the
devil is precisely in the details. The legitimacy of this approach may be
challenged, however, on the ground that an accused who holds an "honest
belief' in consent is "innocent." In view of the controversy about these
issues, Justice Major's comments about "moral innocence" and belief in
consent and their import for proof of criminal responsibility merit close
73 Ewanchuk; supra note 12 at 354 [emphasis in original]. Confusion results when
the phrases
"moral innocence" and "mental innocence" are used loosely, as this remark in Ewanchuk arguably
illustrates.
74 Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 at 513 [Re B.C. Motor Vehicle].
75If potential complainants also assume that "any belief in consent" either is, or shouldbe, a good
and sufficient defence, few sexual assaults will be reported. Anecdotal evidence suggests such
assumptions are still common in Canadian communities. The old rhetoric arguably has a crucial role
in perpetuating them.
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examination. Do such comments suggest that twenty years of debate and
reform have only brought Canadian common law interpretation of mens rea
in sexual assault back to what many Canadians assumed it to be
(incorrectly, I have argued) in the early 1980s? Is Canadian law condemned
to be forever abjectly subject to a cultural bias that sees beliefs as
conclusively exculpatory?76 Is section 273.2 vulnerable to constitutional
challenge under section 7 of the Charter?Should Canadian jurists therefore
follow the English courts and reaffirm the exculpatory effect of a "genuine"
mistake? 77 Or, on the other hand, is Canadian law pointing towards a
resolution of these issues that merits consideration by other jurisdictions
that seek to combine enforceability of the law with analysis of culpability
grounded on subjective awareness?
VI.

CULPABLE AWARENESS AND CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY

Why, we must therefore ask, should scrutiny of culpable awareness
in sexual assault cases extend beyond the accused's belief in consent? Does
this place the "innocent" at risk of conviction? To answer these questions
we must re-examine the basis of criminal responsibility and attempt to
clarify the relationship between "moral innocence" and criminal culpability
in Canadian law.
In the last thirty years, Canadian judges have examined the
prerequisites of conviction and restated the principles of penal liability in
a series of cases. 78 The fundamental proposition in the theory of criminal
responsibility that underlies Canadian criminal law is that each individual
is a rational agent who acts voluntarily and has control over the actions he
or she performs. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the accused is
assumed to act voluntarily and is ordinarily inferred to be aware of the facts
material to the offence. Classification of offences as absolute, strict liability,
76 If that were the case, it would have sweeping implications, implications that are inconsistent
with the law of mens rea, as the text below argues.
77 See Michael Davies, "Lawmakers, Law Lords and Legal Fault: Two Tales from the
(Thames)
River Bank: Sexual Offences Act 2003; . v. G. and Another" (2004) 68:2 J. Crim. L. 130-49;
Kumaralingam Amirthalingam, "Caldwell Recklessness is Dead, Long Live Mens Rea's Fecklessness"
(2004) 67 Mod. L. Rev. 491-500.
78 The views and arguments presented in the text below are consistent with the principles affirmed
in those cases, many of which encompassed challenges under section 7 of the Charter.Some of the
leading cases are cited below. At points, I extrapolate beyond what is explicitly stated in the reasons for
judgment, in order to identify and develop the underlying assumptions and elements in the form of a
rudimentary "theory" of "culpability," which I then use to interpret and evaluate assertions about
"moral innocence."
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or mens rea79 does not affect legal assumptions about the individual, but
instead determines the legal prerequisites of conviction and punishment. 0
In absolute liability offences, fault is inferred from voluntary
commission of the prohibited act, no analysis of evidence of the accused's
awareness of the facts and circumstances that could have a bearing on
culpability or "fault" is permitted, and, because fault may not be disputed,
imprisonment may not be used as a punishment following conviction.8 ' In
strict liability offences, by contrast, the accused is permitted to adduce
evidence and argument to show that he or she exercised "due diligence" or
"reasonable care," and thus was not "negligent." Because the accused is
permitted to contest the inference of culpability or fault that flows from
proof of commission of the act, imprisonment is a permissible punishment.
The conduct of the reasonable person, an objective standard, is used to
assess fault in strict liability offences. An accused's lack of awareness or
misapprehension of a material fact only negatives the inference of fault if
the mistake is "honest" and "reasonable," a mistake that a reasonable
person could have made. In other words, to make a mistake that is not both
"honest" and "reasonable" is itself blameworthy in a strict liability context.
Most, but not all, strict liability offences are "public welfare" or regulatory
offences.
The third category of offences, mens rea offences, includes criminal
negligence and general and specific intent offences. These offences, like
absolute and strict liability offences, are classified by reference to the
standard used to assess fault and the grounds that may be raised to negative
fault. In criminal negligence, mens rea or fault is inferred from the facts
based on the standard of the reasonable person in the same circumstances,
unless the accused lacks capacity:
As is the case with crimes of subjective mens rea, the mens rea for objective foresight of
risking harm is normally inferred from the facts. The standard is that of the reasonable
person in the circumstances of the accused. If a person has committed a manifestly
dangerous act, it is reasonable, absent indications to the contrary, to infer that he or she
failed to direct his or her mind to the risk and the need to take care. However, the normal
inference may be negated by evidence raising a reasonable doubt as to lack of capacity to
appreciate the risk.
Thus, if a prima facie case for actus reus and mens rea are made out, it is necessary to ask a
further question: did the accused possess the requisite capacity to appreciate the risk flowing
from his conduct? If this further question is answered in the affirmative, the necessary moral
fault is established and the accused is properly convicted. If not, the accused must be
79

R v. City of Sault St. Marie, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299.
801bid.
81 Re B.C. Motor Vehicle, supra note 74.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
acquitted.

[VOL. 42, NO. 4

82

Thus in criminal negligence, the accused who is capable of
apprehending risk but does not choose to use that capacity is not "morally
innocent." Accused who do not lack capacity are assumed to have the
abilities of the "reasonable person in the circumstances of the accused." All
capable accused are assessed by that uniform minimum objective standard.
The obligation to conform to the standard is imposed equally by law on
everyone who chooses to participate in the activity. Only the accused who
is incapable of appreciating the risks created by his or her conduct is not
blameworthy. In support of this proposition, Justice McLachlin, as she then
was, cites and quotes (with added emphasis) H.L.A. Hart's statement that
the need for inquiry about the accused's capacity "is dictated by the moral
principle that no one should be punished who could not help doing what he
did."83 The rest of us are held to a uniform legal minimum standard when
we undertake potentially harmful activities.
In another essay, originally published in 1961, four years after that
cited above, Hart concludes that the "subjective element" in negligence that
is crucial for the judgment of blameworthiness is not "a blank mind," but
rather "a failure to exercise the capacity to advert to, and think about and
control, conduct and its risks., 84 Thus, Hart suggests that negligent
individuals are blameworthy because they failed to do that which they could
have done, not simply as a consequence of the bare fact that they failed to
do it. I suggest that it follows that the individual who is convicted of
criminal negligence is blameworthy and justly held culpable because he or
she chose not to avoid orexercise reasonablecontrol over the risk even though
s/he hadthe capacity to apprehendit and the opportunity to avoid it.85 The fact
that the individual's conduct departs to a marked and substantial degree
from the objective standard is the basis for finding that the conduct violates
the standard of conduct imposed by law and constitutes the actusreus of the
offence. The subjective fault element that renders the individual morally
culpable and liable to conviction and punishment lies in the individual's
choice to undertake the activity and perform it in a manner that violates the
82

R. v. Creighton, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 3 at 44, McLachlin J.

83 Ibid. at 62-63 quoting H.L.A. Hart, "Legal Responsibility and Excuses," in Punishment and
Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law (London: Oxford University Press, 1968) 35 at 39
[Punishmentand Responsibility].
84 H.L.A. Hart, "Negligence, Mens Rea, and Criminal Responsibility," reprinted in Punishment
and Responsibility, ibid. at 157.
85 Thus in R. v. Tutton, [1989] 1 S.C.R.1392, the Court abandoned differential treatment of acts
of omission and commission.
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minimum legal standard. In the absence of evidence negativing capacity or
excusing the accused on the ground of reasonable mistake of fact, it is
inferred from the facts that the individual accused did make one or more
choices which entail culpability.16 As in strict liability offences, an accused's
lack of awareness or misapprehension of a material fact does not negative
the inference of culpability in criminal negligence, unless the mistake of fact
is one that is "honest" and "reasonable," that is, a mistake that a reasonable
person in the same circumstances (and thus with the same knowledge of the
facts the accused is shown to have had) could have made, and which can be
described as "unavoidable" in the sense that it was beyond the knowledge
and control of the reasonable person.
By contrast, in general intent mens rea offences culpable awareness
is assessed by a "subjective standard." As before, the accused is assumed to
act voluntarily and, by inference, to be aware of the facts. An accused is
therefore easily found to have acted with awareness of the actual or
possible existence of the very facts and circumstances that are identified in
law as circumstances in which the accused's act is prohibited, and thus to
have made a culpable choice. 87 The fault element that renders the
individual "morally culpable," and liable to conviction and punishment, is
the choice to act with awareness of the material facts. However, because the
standard is subjective, the accused may adduce evidence and present
argument based on the whole of the evidence to challenge all assumptions
and inferences about his or her awareness of the facts. If the accused, for
reasons not within his or her knowledge and control, may have not been
aware of facts that indicated the circumstances were ones in which the
action in question is prohibited, the accused's choice to commit the
prohibited action is not culpable. In particular, established doctrine holds
that an accused charged with a subjective mens rea offence may dispute the
inference of culpability by evidence that he or she made a mistake of fact
(not law), even if it was an unreasonable mistake (not a mistake that a
"reasonable" person would make) as long as the mistake was "honest." This
rule is widely viewed as a definitive feature of subjective liability in criminal
law. This, of course, appears to bring us full circle, but we are now in a
86 What those choices were need not be proven. It is entirely possible that an individual charged
with criminal negligence made an affirmative choice to create a risk of harm and even did so with
subjective foresight of the substantial certainty that another person would be gravely injured or killed.
However, on a charge of criminal negligence or absolute liability, the accused's intention or subjective
foresight are not relevant. The only issues that must be determined are those required by law for
conviction of the offence as charged.
87 The accused's awareness of circumstances in offences prohibiting the causation of harmful
consequences is also inferred, but foresight of consequences is handled as seen above in criminal
negligence. Here as there, culpability lies in the choice to commit the underlying act.
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position to use the principles that govern culpability to clarify the
implications of the doctrine that "honest unreasonable mistakes may
excuse."
The standards of conduct imposed by law apply uniformly and
equally to all persons. This is essential if law is to afford equal protection
to everyone.88 Even mistakes of fact and their effects are subject to legal
criteria. These criteria specify that to have an exculpatory effect, a mistake
of fact must be "honest" and not itself in violation of the legal standard
applicable to the offence. Whether the legal standard is the objective
standard of the reasonable person, as in criminal negligence, or the actual
subjective awareness of the individual accused, as in general and specific
intent offences, that standard applies to determine whether a particular
mistake of fact negates or instead substantiates the inference of culpable
awareness.
In criminal negligence, a mistake of fact must be "reasonable." The
requirement that the mistake be "honest" is separate. Both requirements
must be met. Neither the individual who claims to have made a mistake that
is "reasonable" but not "honest," nor the individual who "honestly" makes
an unreasonable mistake, has a mistake of fact defence that negatives the
inference of culpability. Assume there are two accused, the first an honest
dunce, the second a shrewd liar. Both claim to have made honest and
reasonable mistakes of fact. If assessment by the objective standard shows
the dunce's mistake to have been unreasonable, the mistake cannot
negative culpability and is unavailable as a defence. In such a case, the
accused's "honesty" is irrelevant to the outcome; it cannot alter the
outcome of the case and need not be determined.
The shrewd liar is more of a challenge. In this hypothetical, the
liar's alleged mistake is prima facie "reasonable." The accused liar may
therefore rely on the mistake to negate the inference of culpability in
negligence, unless his or her dishonesty is revealed through crossexamination or other inconsistencies in the evidence. This is not such a
hopeless case for the prosecution as it might appear to be. The trier of fact
will often be able, on the basis of the evidence as a whole, to determine that
the liar was aware that the factual belief, though "reasonable," was, or
might be, mistaken. In an actual case, much of evidence will have a bearing
on both reasonableness and honesty. Evidence to suggest the liar was aware
of facts that are inconsistent with the alleged mistake would tend to show
both dishonesty and that a reasonable person in the circumstances of the
accused-and thus with the knowledge of the facts the accused had-could
88 See Wilson J. on the "universality of rights" in Perka v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 232 at 270-
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not have made the mistake in question. Accordingly, in practice, if the liar's
mistake of fact does not negative the inference of culpability in negligence,
it will most often not be on the ground of the accused's dishonesty, but
rather on the ground that the accused made an avoidable choice and is
therefore "morally culpable." The conclusion that the accused was
"dishonest" then follows as well, but is redundant; the liar is already liable
to be convicted on substantive grounds.89
These issues are discussed as they arise in the context of a general

intent offence (sexual assault), in reasons (in dissent but not on this point)
in Esau by Justice McLachlin, as she then was:
The concepts of wilful blindness and honesty in relation to consent merit further comment.
Canadian law does not, unlike most jurisdictions in the United States, require that the
defendant in a sexual assault trial have acted reasonably. The issue of mistake as to consent
must be assessed on the basis of the particular accused person before the court. If he is more
obtuse than the reasonable man, he may raise this in support of his contention that he
mistakenly thought the complainant was consenting. However, Canadian common law does
impose two requirements. First, the defendant cannot have been wilfully blind or reckless.
The term wilful blindness connotes a deliberate avoidance of the facts and circumstances.
It is the legal equivalent of turning a blind eye, of not seeing or hearing what is there to hear
or see. It is the making of an assumption that the complainant consents without determining
whether, as a matter of fact, the complainant consents. Blindness as to the need to obtain
consent can never be raised by an accused as a defence, since the need for consent is a legal
requirement which the law presumes the defendant to know. On the facts, wilful blindness
to conduct or language which might support an inference of non-consent is similarly of no
avail. The person who is not wilfully blind is the person who is appropriately aware, not only
of the need to obtain consent (which he is presumed to know), but of what the conduct and
circumstances reveal to one who looks to see whether that consent was being given or
withheld. Second, the requirement that the defendant's belief have been honest has a similar
effect. The defendant is not allowed to deceive himself, or to sharply take advantage of a
passive or unclear response. He must honestly believe that the complainant consented. 90

Doctrine thus holds that an "unreasonable" mistake, as long as it
is honest, negatives culpable awareness in a general intent offence.
Although honesty may appear to be the crucial factor, I submit that in
practice it is of limited analytic significance. Again, assume there are two
accused, the first an honest dunce, the second a shrewd liar. Both claim to
have made honest mistakes. If the evidence shows either the dunce's or the
liar's mistake to have been knowing, or due to wilful blindness or
recklessness, the mistake substantiates rather than negates culpability and
89 In both strict liability and criminal negligence, once an accused raises mistake of fact to
challenge the inference of culpability, the mistake is subject to scrutiny. To have an exculpatory effect,
the mistake must be a mistake that a reasonable person, with the knowledge of thefacts the accusedhad,
could make.
90 Supra note 12 at 807-08.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 42, NO. 4

is therefore unavailable as a defence, either in law or on the facts. In such
a case, the accused's "honesty" is irrelevant to the outcome; it cannot alter
the outcome of the case and need not be separately determined. In many
such instances-those of MacFie and Sansregretare examples-the "honest
belief" could either be said to be due to "wilful blindness" in relation to a
material fact or to be based on a mistaken appreciation of the legal
significance of facts of which the accused is well aware.
At this point readers likely recognize that "unreasonable mistakes,"
when they are actually relevant to a material issue, will often substantiate,
rather than negate, the inference of culpable awareness in subjective mens
rea offences, because the person who makes such a mistake will often also
thereby violate the standard applicable to subjective mens rea offences.
That standard requires that everyone exercise the capacities he or she has
to apprehend facts and draw rational inferences from them. As always,
evidence of incapacity requires acquittal. The rest of us are subject to
uniform minimum legal standards. We are free to believe what we will,
however "unreasonable" those beliefs may be, but, in the absence of
incapacity, those beliefs are not necessarily exculpatory.9 1 Each mistake will
substantiate, negate, or be irrelevant to the rebuttable inference of culpable
awareness made whenever an accused commits an act prohibited by law.
The legal effect of an alleged mistake depends entirely on the material facts
and circumstances of which the accused was aware. It is therefore irrational
to conclude that a mistake negates culpable awareness without examining
the accused's actual awareness of the material facts and circumstances. A
mistaken belief is no guarantee of "moral innocence."
VII.

CULPABLE AWARENESS, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY,
AND SEXUAL ASSAULT

We are now in a position to examine the relationship between
"honest belief," culpable awareness, and "moral innocence" in the context
of sexual assault. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, individuals are
assumed to be rational, to act voluntarily, and to choose what they will and
will not do. These assumptions form the foundation for the principles of
criminal justice used to hold individuals responsible when their actions
violate the criminal law. An accused who would avoid "culpability" and
claim "moral innocence" in relation to a general intent mens rea offence
must act like the rational agent the law assumes him or her to be, and
utilize his or her abilities of perception and reason when choosing what to
91 Evidence to permit assessment of cognitive function may be required when a capable accused
claims to be "obtuse."
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do and not do. In the absence of incapacity, the only mistakes that are
exculpatory are those that could be made by a rational agent who was
actually usinghis or herpowers ofperception andreasoningas requiredby law.
In the absence of evidence about the actual perceptual abilities and
reasoning processes of the individual accused, inferences are made based
on assumptions about the abilities of the rational person. If there is
evidence that explains how an alleged mistake may have occurred, the trier
of fact will consider whether the accused was aware of the possibility of
error. If error could not have been anticipated or avoided, the accused is
"morally innocent" and not "culpable." If the accused acted with awareness
that error was possible, he or she possesses the minimum level of culpable
awareness required for conviction. In these circumstances, the choice to
commit the prohibited action entails moral culpability because the accused
was aware that error was possible and could have chosen not to act.
The law of mens rea thus requires full, not merely partial, scrutiny
of culpable awareness. Without a full analysis of mens rea, including an
examination of the material facts and circumstances of which the accused
was aware, it is impossible to determine whether an accused's "belief' in
consent was reckless or wilfully blind. Constitutional guarantees for the
liberty, personal security, and equality rights of all persons require that the
law be enforced, not discounted or avoided. A competent accused is
ordinarily aware of the facts material to the offence. In the absence of
evidence of mistake of fact, failure by an accused to direct his or her
attention to the significance of known facts for the existence of exculpatory
and inculpatory material circumstances indicates, at best, indifference to
those circumstances and is not an excuse. 92 Failure by an accused to
appreciate the legal significance of known facts is a mistake of law, not an
excuse. 93 This is a straightforward application of the principles of criminal
responsibility.
It is therefore an error of law to conclude that if an accused either
did believe or may have believed that the other party "consented," an
acquittal necessarily follows. Instead, as we have seen, general principles
require an examination of culpable awareness to determine whether, in the
whole of the circumstances, an accused's choice to rely on belief in consent
was culpable. This does not invoke duties of care beyond those already
entailed by general legal principles and pertains in full to the law of sexual
assault, before and after the 1992 amendments to the CriminalCode. It is
92 Esau, supra note 12 at 807-08, quoted with approval in Davis,supra note 26, by Lamer
C.J. at
800-01. See also Kenny, supra notes 45, 48.
93
Ewanchuk, supra note 12 at 356-57, Major J. See also Molis, supra note 71; . v. Forster,
[1992]
1 S.C.R. 339; R. v. Jorgenson, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 55.
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therefore apparent that attitudes and assumptions, not the law, have long
been the principal impediments to effective enforcement of the sexual
assault laws.
Sexual assault laws could be drafted to limit liability to conviction
to accused who act with positive knowledge of the absence of consent, and
thus with a mens rea of intention.94 They are not. Knowledge that consent
is absent is one type of "culpable awareness," but sexual assault is an
offence of "general intent." Sexual activity undertaken with recklessness or
wilful blindness towards the absence of consent renders an accused equally
liable to conviction on the ground that the accused, a self-aware rational
agent, chose to act without knowledge of valid consent, voluntarily
communicated. To conclude, without thorough analysis of the accused's
subjective awareness, that the credible assertion of a "belief in consent"
precludes a finding that the accused was reckless or wilfully blind, is to
jump to conclusions and err in law. The law requires that awareness of
material facts "trumps" self-serving beliefs. Were this not so, laws would be
unenforceable. To fail to consider the legal significance of an accused's
awareness of the material facts is to abandon the interests protected by
sexual assault law without justification.
This view of the law represents no change whatsoever in the law
itself. It may require a fundamental shift in widely held attitudes and
assumptions about the practical implications of criminal law, in general,
and sexual assault laws, in particular. Proper interpretation and application
of the law of mens rea shifts the focus of attention from what an accused
may have believed to the facts of which the accused was aware. Awareness
of facts determines whether the choice is culpable. As a matter of law, an
accused is deemed to appreciate the legal significance of facts and
circumstances of which he or she is aware. If the accused was aware of one
or more facts that, in law, signify that consent was or might have been
absent, not voluntary, or not capable, the accused is liable to be convicted.
Mistake of fact is then irrelevant to the outcome and the defence of belief
in consent is unavailable. When a mistake defence is available on the
evidence, a properly instructed trier of fact, deliberating reasonably, will
consider whether the facts and circumstances of which the accused was
aware included factors that are enumerated in section 273.1(2) or are
grounds at common law to infer that consent might be absent, or not
voluntary, or that the complainant might lack capacity to consent, as these
issues are defined in law. In either case, awareness of such facts renders the
accused liable to conviction, despite any "belief in consent," and no matter
94

See, for example, the wording used in s. 181 of the CriminalCode, supra note 1, prohibiting
the
"wilful" publication of news that the accused "knows is false."
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how "sincere," "genuine," or "honest," the belief may have been in the lay
sense of these terms.95
This approach is fully consistent with established principles of
criminal responsibility. Where there is latitude for conscious choice, it is not
unjust to hold an agent accountable for his or her choice. There is no
question that when harm is caused by the act of an accused, who made a
deliberate choice to exercise power with awareness that he or she was only
partially informed about the material circumstances, the accused is
"morally culpable." Liability is based on the accused's subjective awareness,
not imposed by reference to a modified subjective, subjective-objective, or
objective standard. It is the case that the means to acquire knowledge and
validate beliefs about circumstances are not always fully within an
individual's control. When action was necessary and delay impossible, an
accused may even be excused for acts committed with awareness of his or
her ignorance of relevant facts. In the context of sexual assault, such
exculpatory grounds are unavailable, however, because the crucial
decision-to take action in reliance on the belief or knowledge one has-is
avoidable and undeniably a matter of individual choice.9 6 But for the
decision to pursue the sexual activity without knowledge that voluntary
agreement has been communicated by a person with legal capacity, the
accused would not be liable to conviction. The deliberate decision to act
with awareness that one lacks such knowledge demonstrates indifference
or callous disregard for the interests of the other person and contempt for
the law. 97
Not at common law in England, however, see supra
note 77.
96 Even for the capable obtuse accused who is aware that he or she is obtuse.
97 The significance of the distinction between knowledge and belief for the analysis of subjective
fault lies precisely in our subjective experience of the difference. Accordingly, a fully developed theory
of criminal responsibility must take conscious self-awareness or reflexivity into account. Canadian
jurisprudence grounds culpability and liability to conviction on control and choice. Jurists in Canada
need to revisit doctrinal issues within a framework built on those fundamentals and clarify the
terminology used to describe and differentiate the various types of culpability used to justify liability to
conviction andpunishment. The analytical significance of the "choices" made by those accused viewed
as "cognitive agents," persons with capacity to perceive, believe, and know, should be re-evaluated. See
also McIntyre, supra note 45 and Kenny, supra notes 45, 48. Kenny further suggests at 62 that:
[W]hether the belief was reasonable is not simply ... evidence ... that the belief was actually
held: even if the belief was honestly held, its unreasonableness may be evidence of that
indifference to the woman's consent which is sufficient for mens rea. Thus ... the issue of the
reasonableness of the accused's belief can be raised without there being any question of
"finding an intent where none existed" (ibid. at 62).
Thus in Kenny's view, reference to "unreasonableness" does not invariably involve use of an
objective standard to "input" intent. Here, he uses the term "unreasonable" to describe a culpable
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"Moral culpability" in sexual assault therefore lies in the deliberate
choice to engage in sexual activity with subjective awareness of one or more
facts that are rationally inconsistent with the voluntary communication by
the other person of valid capable consent, as defined in section 273.1 and
the common law, to engage in the activity in question. "Moral innocence"
requires that the accused be aware of facts that are rationally consistent
with voluntary communication of consent to engage in the activity in
question by a person who is legally capable of consent, as defined in section
273.1 and the common law, and rationally inconsistent with any other
description of the circumstances. It is therefore clear, I suggest, that Justice
Major's statement in Ewanchuk-"to cloak the accused's actions in moral
innocence, the evidence must show that he believed that the complainant
communicated consent to engage in the sexual activity in question"9 8-is an
incomplete and, to that extent, incorrect statement of the law. Standing
alone, out of context, this statement equates "belief in consent" with "moral
innocence." This misrepresents the law and cannot be what Justice Major
intended to convey. The statement should instead be read in the context of
the reasons and the law as a whole. Had Pappajohnreceived such a reading
thirty-five years ago, much confusion and consternation could have been
avoided. History need not repeat itself.
VIII.

OBJECTIVE OR SUBJECTIVE?

Application of section 273.2(b) to preclude reliance on the defence
of mistaken belief in consent, without consideration by the trier of fact as
to whether the defence is precluded under section 273.2 (a)(ii) (as it would
be in all conceivable cases in which it might be barred under section
273.2(b)), might be taken to show that fault in sexual assault may be
established either by proof of mens rea in the form of subjective awareness
or deviation from an "objective" standard, and further, that section 273.2(b)
is used precisely when an inference of recklessness or wilful blindness
cannot be made under section 273.2(a)(ii). Neither assumption is correct.
Section 273.2(b) does not provide an objective test based on the reasonable
person but instead mandates an examination of the facts of which the
individualaccused was aware and provides that that examination take the
form of application of a formula or test for wilful blindness that the lay trier
of fact will find easy to understand and apply. Section 273.2, as a whole, is

choice to disregard the significance of those facts of which one is aware, as well as those one could
ascertain.
98 Supra note 12 at 354 (emphasis in original).
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thus comparable to section 265(4) in that it codifies, and thereby mandates,
instructions to be followed by the trial judge and the trier of fact,
respectively, when determining whether the defence of belief in consent is
available, in law and on the facts. This view is supported by Justice
Morden's conclusion in Darrach that under section 273.2(b) "[t]he
subjective mens rea component of the offence remains largely intact." 99
That is the final word on the issue in Darrach. The constitutionality of
section 273.2(b) was not at issue inDarrach'sfurther appeal to the Supreme
Court of Canada. There the constitutional challenge was to the rape shield
provisions-ss. 276(1), 276.1(2)(a), 276.2(2), and 276.2(c).
Approaching the debate from another angle, I suggest that
adoption of an "objective" standard to assess culpability would invite
dispositions that reflect community prejudices and practices. To use the
very social norms of sexual conduct that result in the commission of sexual
offences to determine whether an exculpatory defence is available, would,
in the vast majority of cases, only serve to approve those norms and the
conduct based on them. That approach would permit the effective legal
norm to be determined by reference to the "ordinary" conduct of the
"ordinarily" sexually aggressive individual, rather than by a positive
standard pursuant to the rule of law. That approach would also conflict
with the political and constitutional values with reference to which
Canadian sexual assault legislation is framed. Canadian law defines sexual
assault primarily by reference to consent and equal rights of individual
autonomy and self-determination; it does not make community opinions
about the propriety of an accused's conduct or the quantum of force used
indicia of whether there was consent. 00 Those who believe that use of
objective standards, standards based on custom and community attitudes,
to assess culpability in sexual assault cases can result in an interpretation of
the law that is both effective and consistent with the objectives of the
legislation may need to reflect further about the nature and function of
objective standards-what they are, how they operate, and what they
achieve. In Canada, those remain speculative questions; negligent sexual
assault is not an offence.

99R v. Darrach(1998), 122 C.C.C. (3d) 225 at 252 (Ont. C.A.) following McLachlin J.,
as she then
was, dissenting (but not on this point) in Esau, supra note 12 at 813-14 (see supra note 65 and
accompanying text).
100 The use of policy grounds to vitiate consent when an accused intends grievous bodily harm,
as in R. v. Welch (1995), 25 O.R. (3d) 665 (C.A.), only confirms that the absence of consent or
"voluntary agreement," not violence, is the definitive element.
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CONCLUSION

Exculpatory rhetoric and extra-legal beliefs about sexuality have
distorted the operation of the defence of "honest belief in consent" and
subverted application and enforcement of the sexual assault laws for
decades. Old rhetoric can easily perpetuate old attitudes and assumptions
that are inconsistent with Canadian law. The old familiar patterns are likely
to continue, however, despite clarification of the law, unless decision
makers in the criminal justice system break away from that old rhetoric and
the self-contradictory doctrinal assumptions linked with it, and take a fresh
approach to the analysis of culpability in sexual assault. We must abandon
the working assumption that proof of culpability turns on the credibility of
the accused's "honest belief' in consent and focus instead on analysis of the
significance of the accused's awareness of facts material to consent as
defined in section 273.1.
I recognize, however, that assumptions embedded in a culture and
sustained by rhetoric are not easily set aside. I also recognize that a solution
proposed in general terms is an insufficient response to the subtle and
profoundly insidious and subversive influence that cultural beliefs
inconsistent with law continue to exercise on all decision makers, from
complainants to judges. Such a proposal is especially insufficient and
unsatisfying in an article that purports to demonstrate that it is precisely in
the practicalapplicationof the law that errors are perpetuated. Therefore,
in a subsequent article,' 01 I examine the practical issues that arise in
implementing the shift in analytic focus proposed here. That article
discusses the implications of that shift for decisions about the availability
of the defence of belief in consent pursuant to section 265(4). The
objectives are: (1) to maximize clarity in delineating the legal issues to be
decided; and (2) to curtail reliance on beliefs based on myth, stereotype,
and the other extra-legal assumptions that distort analysis and subvert the
application and enforcement of legal norms in sexual assault cases. Model
based on the analysis in these two articles are proposed in
jury instructions
02
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101 "Sexual Assault: Availability of the Defence of Belief in Consent" (2005) 84 Can. Bar. Rev.
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Lucinda Vandervort, "The Defence of Belief in Consent: Guidelines and Jury Instructions for
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